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EQUITY AND "FUSION" IN ILLINOIS
ROGER L.

SEVERNS*

O N the first page of a copy of a famous old law book, full of
quaint phrases, in the handwriting of one who signed himself "C. Gray, 1735," there is the following inscription: "Vide
2 Vernon, 417, where it is laid down that a devise to A at 21,
and to be paid at 21 are one and the same, and the distinction
in this book laid down is without a difference." Whether C.
Gray, Esq., wrote in petulance or whether he wished to preserve a citation for future use, his inscription serves as a reminder of the unstable character of many distinctions developed in legal thinking. The confusion and perplexity produced by the assumed universality of such distinctions as that
between substance and procedure, between rule and discretion, and between law and fact are familiar. No less chaotic
are the results reached by assuming the absolute character
of the distinction between law and equity. The difficulty in
each instance arises from the attempt to separate the distinction from the purpose for which it is made.
For nearly a century one of the most important aspects of
legal reform in the United States has been the movement for
reform in civil procedure. Wherever extensive efforts have
been made to make over the existing rules and system of civil
procedure there have been attempts at so-called "fusion" of
law and equity. A great deal has been said and written concerning the advantages and disadvantages of fusion and a
great deal has been said in criticism and in praise of the results achieved where fusion has been tried. Methods and
means have been compared and the wise have disagreed.
* Member of Illinois Bar; Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College

of Law.
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In the course of the code movement, later efforts at reform sought to avoid the difficulties with fusion that had attended earlier experience; frequently to no avail. Often fusion seemed to result in decided changes in substantive rights
instead of merely modifying the methods by which those
rights were recognized and protected. And as frequently,
fusion seemed to produce new complications in the relation of
equity to law in place of or in addition to the old ones. These
results were false to the code ideal of simplification. That
reforms in civil procedure should produce some changes in
substantive rights was startling only to those who assumed
the possibility of drawing once and for all a line of absolute
distinction between substance and procedure, forgetting the
famous admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes. The new complications in the old controversy between equity and law can be
attributed in large part to a failure to examine and apply the
terms "equity" and "law" and the "distinction between
equity and law" in the light of the purpose of their use in the
code provisions.
Serious and comprehensive reforms in civil procedure
came to Illinois late in the course of the code movement. The
Civil Practice Act of 1933 was the first attempt to accomplish
the major objectives of that movement. In many ways the
act differs from those adopted previously in other states and
evidences the efforts of the draftsmen to take advantage of
the experience of others.
Just what the act accomplishes in the direction of fusion
is not entirely clear and the reports of six years of judicial experience with it are not greatly illuminating. It is believed,
however, that the use of the approach to the problems of
equity and law indicated above can accomplish much in the
direction of avoiding some of the serious difficulties that have
given fusion in some quarters its bad name.
Illinois has had a long tradition of the separate administration of.the rules of law and equity. The Ordinance of 1787
provided for the creation of a general court for the Northwest
Territory to have only a common law jurisdiction,' and contained a provision respecting the right to trial by jury. Equity
1 "...
There shall also be appointed a court, to consist of three judges, any
two of whom to form a court, who shall have a common law jurisdiction.
Ordinance of 1787, par. 4.
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jurisdiction was extended to the courts of the Territory by an
amendment to the Ordinance in 18052 and in that year the territorial legislature created a separate court with a single
judge to be called the Court of Chancery. At the same time
provision was made for the legal effect and operation of the
decrees of the Court of Chancery and they were placed upon
the same footing as judgments at law.4 The procedure in
Chancery was regulated by the territorial legislature in 18065
and was revised in 1807.6 In 1816 it appears that the Illinois
territorial legislature, in making provision for the court system for the territory, conferred upon the Circuit Courts both
7
law and equity jurisdiction.
The laws passed by the first legislature after Illinois became a state provided for the exercise of the equity jurisdiction by the judges of the Supreme and Circuit Courts.' Moreover, the practice and procedure of the High Court of Chancery, as far as shell be deemed applicable, was to be adopted.9
As has been mentioned before, there were extensive provisions for the legal effect of equitable decrees.
It appears that the separate Court of Chancery established by the territorial legislature for the Northwest Territory
did not endure very long. According to one authority it did
not exercise its power since no provision was made to pay the
salary of the judge. 10 Subsequent changes adopted the method
employed so generally in the United States of providing for
the administration of law and equity by the same courts but
with separate law and chancery sides. This system continued. 11 There were, of course, the usual constitutional pro12
visions for trial by jury.
Down to the Civil Practice Act of 1933 the practice at law
and in equity was regulated by separate statutes. The only
2 The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809,
edited with an introduction by
Francis S. Philbrick (Published by the Trustees of the Illinois State Historical
Library, Springfield, 1930), p. clxiv.
8 Ibid., p.1 0 8.
4 Ibid., § 18, p.111.
5 Ibid., p. 193.
6 Ibid., pp. 507-13.
7 Laws of Illinois Territory, 1815-1816, p. 48.
8 Act approved Mar. 22, 1819, § 1, Laws of 1819, p. 170.
9 Ibid., § 2, Laws of 1819, p. 170.
10 The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809. Introduction by Francis S. Philbrick, pp. clxvi-ii.
11 Constitution of 1848, Art. V, § 8; Constitution of 1870, Art. VI, § 12; IM. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 22, § 1.
12 Constitution of 1848, Art. XIII, § 6; Constitution of 1870, Art. II, § 5.
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glance in the direction of fusion which can be discerned
through all this time is the provision in the Practice Act of
1907 for the transfer of cases begun on the wrong side of the
court to the proper docket. 13 Even this small gesture was
spoiled by the fact that there was no saving in expense since
there was required not only the payment of costs, but also
the payment of filing fees. Hence it was as advantageous to
begin all over again and it does not appear that the provision
was often relied on.
Against this background of the traditional separation of
law and equity, in an atmosphere of decisions reiterating that
the Circuit Courts of Illinois on the equity side thereof are the
descendants of the High Court of Chancery, 1 4 the Civil Practice Act of 1933 must be viewed. Part of this background also
is the more-than-eighty-years experience with fusion in other
states.
The sober dignity of the language used by the New York
Commissioners of 1847 in their attempt to correct the evils
which they believed to inhere in the separate administration
of law and equity reveals the seriousness with which they regarded the problems created by separate jurisdictions and
the sincerity of their belief that a clean sweep of all the old
forms was the only possible solution. 5 On the other hand,
faith that some, at least, of the old ways are best is reflected
in the phrases of Section 31 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act of
1933.16 To some extent these differing beliefs exemplify the
lack of agreement about the nature of equity and the content
of the term "equity" that has characterized much of legal
thinking. To understand and apply either section intelligently
it is necessary to ascertain what significance is intended to be
given to equity as it is used in each. When distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity or distinctions in the
manner of pleading in such actions and suits are to be obliterated it is necessary to be sure what equity is in the minds
14 Mahar v. O'Hara, 9 Ill. 424, at 427 (1847).
13 Practice Act of 1907, § 40.
15 "The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms
of all such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and, there shall
be in this state, hereafter, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be
denominated a civil action." Code of Procedure of 1848, § 62. First Report of
the Commissioners, p. 87.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 155.
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of the draftsmen as they propose such changes. In order to
reach some conclusion as to this, it has been necessary to examine the content that has been assigned to equity through
the long course of its development. Terms of the law have no
greater tendency to remain constant in meaning through the
years than have other word-symbols of ideas. The term equity
has shared the common instability. With characteristic lightness of touch Maitland emphasized the nature of equity as a
body of rules administered by separate courts of a special nature' while in more ponderous terms the Supreme Court of
Illinois spoke recently of equity as a developing system."8
These and other expressions are typical of the truth that
terms and the definitions of terms will vary as do the purposes of their use.
What has been the content which time and usage have assigned to "equity"? In an instructive essay 9 Pollock has said
that the notion underlying the term equity as it first came to
be used in the English law was "that of a doctrine or authority
capable of preventing the hardship which otherwise would
ensue either from the literal extension of positive rules to extreme cases or from the exclusion, also by a strictly literal
construction, of cases that fall within the true intention of the
rule."20 Thus at the beginning, there was in the idea of equity
a blending of power and the purpose and manner of its exercise; power to modulate strict rules and an ideal which gave
direction to power. Equity was a symbol for the desire of
men that the impartiality and universality of the rules of
strict law should yield when common fairness and right required it. It was the element of flexibility in law.
The curious story of how the administration of this flexibility fell into the hands of the Chancellor is a thrice-told tale.
But when the Chancellor came to be looked upon as the chief
17 F. W. Maitland, Equity (2d ed.), p. 1.
18 "The above and similar cases, though not deciding the question here,
evidence a recognition by this court that rules of equity jurisdiction have developed and are developing, and that judicial proceedings must be adjusted to
facts as they are. All who are conversant with the history of equity jurisprudence know that as a distinct system it has been of constant growth and development from its inception, covering a period of hundreds of years." First National
Bank v. Bryn Mawr Bldg. Corp., 365 Ill.409 at 421, 6 N. E. (2d) 654 at 661 (1937).
19 Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in the Law (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.,
1922), "The Transformation of Equity," p. 180.
20 Ibid., p. 181.
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source of equity in the sense just described, the term began
to take on a new meaning. The process and forces which
turned the Chancellor into a judge, turned his determinations
into rules and gave a new content to equity. It was said that
he administered equity, and there was meant not merely that
he had the power to modify strict law and might be moved by
ethical considerations to exercise it, but also that he administered rules which his growing judicial habits had created.
"Rules are the limits that the continued exercise of discretion
establishes." Thus the Court of Chancery was not merely administering equity, it was a court of equity, and the rules
there formulated were the rules of equity.
In this way the meaning of equity came to be extended.
The word meant more than power and a certain manner of
using power. In turn, this enlarged meaning produced a further extension. Even the methods which the Chancellors developed for the discovery of facts and the system which they
created for the orderly conduct of the business of the court
came to be spoken of as equitable. Ethical considerations for
the exercise of prerogative powers came to be blended with a
developing body of rules and a unique judicial procedure.
Equity never quite ceased to signify a modification of the
application of strict law where right and fairness required it.
But from the procedure in Chancery, the rules, and the earlier
meaning came the common use of the term in the period of
the competing jurisdictions of common law and chancery
courts. Equity meant the rules for the exercise of the Chancellor's extraordinary powers, which powers by then ran in
the deep grooves which continued use had worn. It meant the
peculiar methods by which those powers were made effective.
It meant also a certain discretion in the application of rules,
legal or equitable. In a given context the word might mean
any one of the three or it might mean all of them in combinawith it
tion. The notion of discretion in equity always carried
21
a suggestion of higher moral quality and tone.
Modern equity must be looked at against this back21 Compare the appraisal by Edwin C. Patterson in a review of the second
edition of Eaton, Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence, "What is Equity," 9 A. B.
A. J. 647 (1923). See also W. W. Cook, "Equity," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, V, 582,
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ground. Today the term may signify at one time powers,
rules, procedure, and discretion. But as time has passed the
element of discretion with its accompanying ethical significance has shrunk in proportion to the elements of powers,
rules and procedure. With the decline of discretion the significance of equity as the element of flexibility in law also
diminishes. Formal English equity suffered from the blight
of excess that has always afflicted flexibility in all legal systems. Cohen has said that "legal history shows, if not alternating periods of justice according to law and justice without
law, at least periodic waves of reform during which the sense
of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and flexibility
into the law and makes it adjustable to its work. In course of
time, however, under the social demand for certainty, equity
gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules, so that, after a
' 22
while, a new reform wave is necessary.
The decline of discretion in equity is not always apparent.
The equity judge still feels that he wields a broader discretionary power than is permitted in the administration of ordinary legal remedies. And he is right. But the discretion
which is his, in many if not most instances, amounts to little
more than a choice of result depending upon the weight given
23
to certain factors which precedent requires him to consider.
The discretion which was a creative force for the development of new rules and the recognition of new interests out of
prevailing social, moral and ethical ideals has steadily if
imperceptibly lost momentum. Such an element is never
wholly lost to equity any more than the creative element disappears from law itself. But it tends to approach the vanish24
ing point in the time of the maturity of law.
"What, then, is equity?" The answer must be different
today from that when Bentham asked the question, but the
appraisers do not agree. Equity is many things, or rather
the term is used in many senses and confusion results.
Certain powers of the courts are spoken of as equitable
powers. Certain orders which judges give are thus described
22 Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1933), "Rule Versus Discretion," p. 259 at 261.

23 Cases dealing with the application of the "clean hands" maxim are familiar
examples.
24 See Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity," 5 Col. L. Rev. 20 (1905).
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to set them off from ordinary judicial action because of a
peculiar dramatic quality which they possess. Historically
the Chancellor possessed an extraordinary power of issuing
commands and requiring obedience to them which distinguished the relief he awarded from that obtainable in ordinary actions at law. The ability to command the performance
of specific acts and to compel compliance by coercive
methods remained essential in the modern legal system. Most
of the other so-called equitable powers are simply powers
which equity judges and law judges possess in common, what
differences exist being principally differences in terminology,
procedural machinery, or reasons for their exercise.2 5
The creative genius of equity is said to be exemplified by
the modern trust. But the creation of the trust belongs to
history. The child becomes independent of the parent and the
trust tends to become an institution. In the law of trusts and
of mortgages the role of equity has been creative but the law
relating to both has been marked-off from the rest of equity.
A large area of the sphere covered by the term equity is
occupied by specific equitable remedies. These are the tools
which the equity judges forged to accomplish the proper adjustment of legal relations, most of them developing when the
jurisdiction of the Chancery was in its period of greatest
growth. These tools have acquired names usually derived
from some feature of the procedural process which originally
obtained in the Chancery Court. Injunctions, decrees for
specific performance, the constructive trust, decrees for accounting, the following of trust funds, receiverships, and nonstatutory declarations of rights are characteristic contributions of equity to the field of remedies.
The body of principles and rules which has been developed regarding the proper use of these remedies is perhaps the
largest part of modern equity. Frequently when equity or substantive equity is spoken of, this part of law is meant. In this
sense, equity is simply part of the legal system; the principles
and rules grouped under the heading "equitable" are so
placed for historical reasons.
Modern equity includes, too, a body of procedural rules
25 See Walter Wheeler Cook, "The Powers of Courts of Equity," 15 Col. L.
Rev. 37, 106, 228 (1915).
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and techniques which are its own. Some of the most important
of modern procedural reforms have resulted from the adaption to a unified procedural system of the rules which equity
judges perfected. The mode of trial, fact-finding technique,
a system of pleading, and certain rules for the orderly conduct of judicial business served to set off equity procedure
from that at law in the matured legal system.
And finally there is discretion in modern equity as in all
law. In the process of becoming law equity has retained
something of its earlier flexibility. As has been pointed out,
discretion in equity is a compound of power and the discretion
and technique of the exercise of power. The division and
centralization of power as between courts and other governmental agencies is not the same as it was in the early period
of equity's growth. Judicial interference with the application
of legal rules is of rarer occurrence. A new science of legislation appears to be asserting serious claims to supply flexibility. And the development of administrative techniques as
employed by bodies which are not yet courts has elbowed
judicial discretion into a smaller space. But this was foredoomed when the Chancellor became a judge. Yet enough
of power remains or is vouchsafed to make its exercise important.
The greatest change in modern equitable discretion is in
the direction of its exercise. Equity seldom so boldly asserts
its contradiction to or its power to modify the application or
administration of positive legal rules. Legislative and administrative action today absorb much of the necessity for
this and the infiltration of equitable principles into law has
removed many anachronisms. Most of the discretionary
power which remains in equity today is directed toward the
adaptation of existing remedies to meet new requirements of
action, and the recognition of new interests created by social
change. 6 The period of equity in the sense of discretionary
power institutionalized to modify, relax, reshape and refit
the rules of law to meet the shifting conditions of society appears to be past.' The relation between law and social change
26 See Sidney Post Simpson, "Fifty Years of American Equity," 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 180 (1936).
27 Compare Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity," 5 Col. L. Rev. 20
(1905); Percy Bordwell, "The Resurgence of Equity," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 741
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is being regulated by other agencies with different techniques.
Thus in the end, the term "equity" becomes a term of
art. The earlier symbol of an ideal looks across the years
that have marked the process of becoming to the present
denotation of an area in the modern legal order. Powers,
remedies, rules, procedure and a certain distinctive character of discretion make up modern equity and these are
within and not without the modern legal system.
In the beginning of equity the atrophy of common law
caused an appeal to prerogative. The Chancellor, trustee
of the sovereign power, saw inadequacies, injustices, and imperfections in the workings of the existing legal order and
did something about them when it was expedient to do so.
Remedies came before rights, and discretion before rules.
Continued exercise of discretion wore paths, and remedies
regularly awarded came eventually to rest upon rights added
to the legal order. Thus was the law enriched. The very
essence of formal equity was and is the created remedies
which in turn produced, by familiar processes, rules, principles, devices, and concepts. These remedies, and a distinctive and characteristic point of view in their exercise,
itself the product of the discretion before described, are together the source of all things today called equitable.
So equity was fitted into the legal order, but there were
difficulties in the process. The original idea of the exercise of
a power outside of the law and superior to it tended to prevent
assimilation of equity as part of the legal system to the ordinary institutions for law administration. In England a separate court administered the "equity law." In the United
States in those places where separate courts were not created,
the principle of separation was carried out by a division of
cases into those calling for ordinary treatment and those requiring the special application of the equity law. Judges were
expected to behave as chancellors when performing the latter
function and to keep the two sides of their courts separate and
distinct.
This caused trouble. Because of the fact that equity originally endeavored to grant relief from the universality of law
(1934); Mitchell Franklin, "Equity in Louisiana," 9 Tulane L. Rev. 485 (1935);
Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., "The Spirit of Equity," 16 Boston U. L. Rev. 345 (1936).
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and thus acted to add to, modify and correct legal rules 28 it
was the necessary result that the rules and principles which
came to form the equity law were formulated as opposed to
the ordinary rules of the common law. This led to confusion,
to dissatisfaction, to injustice, and finally to reform. As
equity became law it was inevitable that sooner or later it
must be assimilated to the rest of law.
The break down of separate equity administration was followed by the period of fusion. In general, so-called fusion of
law and equity aims at the eradication of conflicting results
that might obtain depending upon which jurisdiction was invoked, and the prevention of the injustice resulting when
litigants are penalized in one way or another for resorting to
the wrong court. There are differing viewpoints as to the
means by which these aims are best accomplished and these
will be discussed hereafter.
The main charges against the order of affairs before
fusion were three. The confusion caused by separation of
jurisdictions has been mentioned. The time-honored division
of the equity jurisdiction into the three classes of exclusive,
concurrent, and auxiliary is a recognition of the difficulties
which beset the administration of the legal system under such
conditions. The fact that equity and law were parts of the
same system and existed for the same ends was not sufficiently recognized to allow them to work smoothly together.
The origin of equity and the attitude toward it engendered
by the case-hardening of law caused the mirage of separate
systems organized for different ends. The idea of a superior
ethical quality operated to embalm the discretionary equity
of the administrative chancellors. The result was chaos.
Over-refined notions of the adequacy of legal remedies and
the idea that certain kinds of problems were sacred to law
courts or to juries led the equity courts into countless errors
of refusal. In other situations differing remedies led to surprisingly different results in parallel cases. Likewise, attitudes on the part of law judges that certain interests should
only be dealt with in equity led to hardship occasioned by
nonrecognition.
28 Harold Greville Hanbury, Modern Equity (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd.,
1935), p. 92.
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A second charge against the exisiting separation was the
expense it added to the already high cost of litigation. An
honest error in choosing the wrong court was penalized, if
not by a loss of right of action, at least by the necessity for
the payment of additional costs. This is not to mention the
cost of the delays, inefficiencies, and opportunities for dilatory
tactics which the system made possible.
Finally, when the legal order faced the period of fusion,
there were anachronisms and artificialities in the procedure
both in equity and at law which would have brought about
reform even without the problems which competing jurisdictions created. Common law pleading was doomed. Mode of
trial in equity although benefited by absence of the jury as
of right, was embarrassed, hindered, and delayed by the use
of outmoded fact-finding techniques.
The desire for simplicity, order, and certainty produced
the new order of things. Fusion of law and equity spread
rapidly from New York to many of the other states. And in
England, also, statutes and rules banished competing jurisdictions. 9 In New York, as has been said, simplicity, order
and certainty were sought through a statute abolishing the
formal distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. 0
In England, we are told that the distinction between law actions and equity actions was thought to be so deeply imbedded
that it could not be wiped out. Therefore, provision was made
for the administration of law and equity by the same court in
the same case with a provision that in case of conflict between
legal and equitable rules, equity should prevail. 1 Less ambitious attempts at fusion frequently took the form of statutes
providing for equitable defenses to actions at law 82 and statutes providing for the transfer of causes from law to equity
and from equity to law. 3
29

The story is well told by Robert Wyness Millar in "The Old Regime and

the New in Civil Procedure," Law: A Century of Progress (New York University
Press, 1937) I, 207-65. See also Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies,
pp. 1145-6.
See note 15.
30 Code of Procedure of 1848, § 62.
31 Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies, p. 1157; Robert Wyness
Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure," Law: A Century of
Progress, I, 224.
32

Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies, p. 1146.

33 Ibid., p. 1150.
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The objects of a legal system from the point of view of
those who advocated abolition of the formal distinction between law and equity are well stated in the report of the New
York Commissioners.
The object of every suit, so far as modes of proceeding are concerned,
is to place the parties whose rights are involved in it, in a proper and
convenient form, before the tribunal by which they are to be adjudicated;
to present their conflicting allegations, plainly and intelligibly to each
other and to the court; to secure by adequate means a trial or hearing of
the contested points; to obtain a judgment or determination adapted to
the justice of the case; and to effect the enforcement of that judgment, by
vigorous and efficient means. This object is not peculiar to any form of
remedy, whether it be legal or equitable, or whether it fall within any
one of the subordinate classes of actions, as they now exist at law, but
34
is common to all.

Thus the terms "law" and "equity" are not to be regarded
as terms describing separate systems, but as describing
simply parts of a single system. Indeed the terms as applied
to procedure must cease to have any save an historical significance. There is ample justification for this point of view.
There was a time when English law knew no such separation
of jurisdictions or the powers of courts, nor any essential
difference in the character of legal rules. Equity in the sense
of flexibility was in the administration of the rules by courts.
This was in the days before rigor iuris; and rigor aequitatis8
was in the distant future. In a sense, therefore, the ideal of
this sort of fusion must have for its realization a retracing of
steps. Equity is simply a part of law-all except the clear
essence that signifies the intelligent administration of legal
rules. Let equity be diffused and let it permeate the entire
legal system! There is no validity to a distinction in any excepting an historical sense.
This is an ideal, and the New York Commissioners thought
they had established the foundation for its attainment when
they phrased the famous Section 62 before referred to. That
Section 62 and its successors 8 have seemingly not affected
Code of Procedure of 1848, First Report of the Commissioners, pp. 74-5.
Harold Greville Hanbury, Essays in Equity (Oxford, 1934), '"The Field of
Modern Equity," p. 35.
34
35

36 The present provision is New York Civil Practice Act, § 8:

"...

There is

only one form of civil action. The distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity, and the forms of those actions and suits, have been abolished."
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its realization 7 is not the fault of the draftsmen. Nor is it
entirely the fault of the judges into whose hands was given
the task of construction and interpretation. Lack of success
must be attributed to causes that inhere in the traditional
structure of the legal system; factors that make impossible
in law, as elsewhere, a complete break with the past.
It is not always remembered that from the first there
have been those influential in guiding the course of the law
who have not agreed with the ideal. Nor has this been in
every case due to an unconsidering conservatism. The system of equity has been regarded as one of the brilliant achievements of the Anglo-American legal order."
It has been
strongly argued that those parts of our legal system which
were developed by courts of equity as distinguished from
courts of law bear a deep impress which they derive from the
nature of their origin. In order to make them operate successfully, a separation from the rest of the system is necessary, since otherwise they would fall into the rut of ordinary
law administration. Holdsworth has forcefully expressed this
point of view. 9
The separate courts of law and equity and their separate systems of
procedure and pleading and evidence are dead. But they "rule us from
their graves," because they still live in the separate rules which they
have created, and in the separate intellectual caste which they impose
upon those who study and apply them.

It is also argued that the separation, having become traditional, cannot be abolished by legislative fiat nor can the
legal thinking of centuries done in the traditional forms of
law and equity be swept from the minds of the administrators
and practitioners of the modern law. In the test of experience
this has proved to be true. Sometimes the attempt to mix
traditional modes of thinking with modern code provisions
has not done justice to the best in either.4 0
See Clark, Code Pleading, pp. 47-50.
W. S. Holdsworth, "Equity," 51 L. Q. Rev. 142 (1935); Henry Schofield, 3
Am. Law School Rev. 178 (1912); Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity,"
5 Col. L. Rev. 20 (1905).
39 W. S. Holdsworth, "Blackstone's Treatment of Equity," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1929).
40 "The union of law and equity is justly considered to be the foundation
principle of the code reform. The current resurrection of law and equity as
distinct systems in New York can only be viewed with dismay by those
interested in a simpler pleading which shall emphasize substantive rights, not
37
38
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A case can be made for fusion and a case can be made
against it. Those who argue for and those who argue against
it agree in general as to the necessity for reform in the administration of the law. There are few fundamental differences
as to objectives. Mainly, there is lack of agreement as to
means to be employed. Frequently where law and equity are
concerned disagreement is due to differences as to the nature
and meaning of equity. These differences can be observed in
the arguments, related to the problem here discussed, concerning the real or fictitious nature of the conflict between law
and equity4 and the question of whether equity should be
42
taught as a separate course in law schools.
Equity means discretionary power and its exercise, the
principle of flexibility in law. It means certain powers possessed by courts. It means certain specific remedies and the
rules for their use. It sometimes means certain groups of
substantive rules concentrated around the devices of trusts,
mortgages, and the concept of property. Equity signifies a
certain system of procedure which includes a type of pleading,
a mode of trial, and certain rules of practice. And equity
means a certain technique for the handling of remedies that
is described by the word discretion. The question in fusion is:
"What is sought to be fused?" In the codes the question is:
"What distinctions between law and equity are to be abolished?" And what is desirable to fuse or obliterate is an
equally significant question. The trouble with some of the
discussions of these questions is like that of Judge Selden"
that too much of the merely logical is developed without any
endeavor to interpret language in.the light of the objectives
which motivated its use. So often the discussions ignore what
reform sought to do and so frequently the difficulty is in becoming entangled with the meaning of words. Code reform
set out to accomplish certain results, to remedy certain conprocedural forms." Charles E. Clark, "The Union of Law and Equity," 25 Col.
L. Rev. 1 (1925).
41 See Percy Bordwell, "The Resurgence of Equity," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
741 (1934).
42 See Walter Wheeler Cook, "The Place of Equity in our Legal System," 3
Am. Law School Rev. 173 (1912); Henry Schofleld, "Reply to Mr. Cook," 3 Am.
Law School Rev. 178 (1912); Percy Bordwell, "The Resurgence of Equity," 1
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 741 (1934); W. S. Holdsworth, "Equity," 51 L. Q. Rev. 142
(1935).
43 Reubens v. Joel, 13 N. Y. 488 (1856).
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ditions which brought about malaise in the legal order. Certain conditions were to be eliminated. The general objectives
were fairly clear. The confusion, in part, results from a violation of one of the first commands of judicial method when
dealing with written words, i.e., to discover the meaning of
a particular part, read the whole. The codes sought to eliminate conditions more than distinctions.
In New York when the code of 1848 became effective, the
separate courts of law and of chancery had been done away
with by constitutional change. 4 There had been no thought
of trying to abolish the distinction between those courts and
other courts. The truth was the old courts were legislated out
of existence and new courts were set up. There was a good
object lesson in this which could have been better learned.
When the Commissioners formulated the code, they tried to
carry forward the work of eliminating the difficulties in the
existing system, not to wipe out distinctions between things
which were fundamentally not the same. Perhaps better
language could have been employed. Perhaps the approach
used in New York was unfortunate. Even so, what was undertaken was fairly obvious and need not have led to such difficulties as were raised.
Abolishing of distinctions means more than erasing dividing lines. When a partition is knocked out between two
rooms, neither room in the "room" sense longer exists. The
result is the creation of a new room out of the two. Eliminating
distinctions means abolishing something which theretofore
existed and creating something new. In the fusing of equity
and law the question is what to eliminate and what to preserve
in its existing form.
In the various forms which fusion has taken there has
been no attempt to root out flexibility and make law more
rigid. Especially today the effort seems to be toward a return
to flexibility. No one has suggested that the powers of courts
which were called equitable powers, particularly the power
to issue commands, should be abolished. No one has contended, at least with much success, that the trust, the mortgage, and all so-called equitable interests in things should
44

Code of Procedure of 1848.

First Report of the Commissioners,

p. 69.
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cease to exist. Nor has there been any serious attack upon
the various remedies or the bodies of rules for their exercise
which form so large a part of modern equity. The principle
of discretion in the administration of legal rules seems not to
lack support.
The equity that is dealt with by statutes of fusion is the
procedural equity. In many American jurisdictions there
have never been separate courts of law and separate courts
of equity. This has resulted in an extensive reshaping of
procedural rules drawing from both the traditional English
systems. As has been stated, the object of recent reform has
been to permit by a modification of procedure the administration of both kinds of rules by the same court in a single action
or proceeding to the end that there be complete adjustment of
the difficulties between the parties with the least expense and
delay.
To accomplish this object it has been necessary to eliminate the old systems of common law and equity pleading and
to substitute a new system. It has been necessary to carry
forward the devising of rules for the conduct of trials and
proceedings in court consistent with the administration of the
rules of equity and law together in the same case. There remain two modes of trial, since positive constitutional provisions protect the one and elimination of the other would
obviously be ill advised.45
Differences between modern statutes are dictated by
ideas as to the best means to accomplish these results. Is it
best to try to induce the thinking away of the differences between actions at law and suits in equity by doing away with
both and substituting the so-called code cause of action? Or
is it better to provide for the same system of pleading in both
and for the administration of legal and equitable rules in the
same case? Or is it more desirable to maintain an equity
side and a law side to the courts but permit of an easy transfer from one side of the court to the other? These are questions concerning which there can be great disagreement.
The ideal of complete fusion has already been stated.
45 In some jurisdictions constitutions are held to protect the right to a trial
by the court or with an advisory jury. Clark, Code Pleading, p. 60.
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Some have thought desirable a system in which all but an
historical distinction in the meaning of equity as against that
of law should be excluded.4 6 Others like Pound,4 7 have felt that
in doing away with the distinctions in procedure between
equity and law, the valuable characteristics of equity were in
danger of being lost to the legal system. The latter point of
view reveals a greater faith in equity's ability to supply flexibility, while the former sees no distinguishing characteristic
in equity in this regard. Pound Saw legal rules tending to
supersede equitable rules and acceleration in the hardening
of equity as a result of the system of amalgamation of equity
and law. 48 On the other hand where too much separation is
maintained, equity administration tends to become rarified
and sanctimonious and to forget or ignore its partnership with
law. 4"
Experience has shown the difficulties of attempting too
much in the way of fusion as well as those of attempting too
little. Equity and law are terms that have become deeply
imbedded in legal thinking. "The tradition of separation
which they inherit will long cling to them." It has been suggested, too, that the discretion which is necessary to the very
existence of a working legal system is better kept in hand
when restricted to exercise through its traditional form.5"
"Moreover there are differences between substitutional relief, between a discretionary and a rigid application of remedies, between controversies suitable to determination by a
jury and those not so suitable whether by reason of complexity
or otherwise which will survive any changes in procedural
Charles E. Clark and James Wm.Moore, "A New Federal Civil Procedure
The Background," 44 Yale L. J. 387 (1935).
47 Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity," 5 Col. L. Rev. 20 (1905).
48 Ibid. Cf. William F. Walsh, "Merger of Law and Equity under Codes and
Other Statutes," 6 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 157 (1929).
49 Case law equity tends to reduce to rules what should remain discretionary.
Rules of rigid application for determining adequacy of legal remedies frequently
are substituted for an examination of the circumstances before the court to
determine by comparison what remedy should be applied. See the cases dealing
with a defendant's insolvency for an example. It would seem that modern
"fusion" could help to avoid this situation since the same judge could use either
remedy. Also legal remedies might become less rigid in the hands of judges
who were discretion conscious. See Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime
and the New in Civil Procedure," Law: A Century of Progress, I, 252-7.
50 W. S. Holdsworth, "Blackstone's Treatment of Equity," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1929).
46
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forms. Equity continues to exist though separate equity practice disappears."'
Whether fusion is approached in the manner of the New
York code or is attempted by provisions making possible the
administration of legal and equitable rules together while
recognizing the difference between them, either way, major
problems are created. Even in jurisdictions where provisions
for fusion have been more modest in their scope serious problems have arisen. The chief responsibility for working out
sensible solutions of these problems falls upon the courts. And
it is a responsibility which reviewing courts must share with
trial courts. Reviewing courts are sometimes too far removed
from first hand contention with these problems and should
have and make use of the active cobperation of the trial judges
who* must apply the authoritative decisions made above.
There seem to be at least eight major problems involved
in the fusion of law and equity. Some of these have received
similar treatment in almost all jurisdictions in which they
have arisen. Others seem to remain unsolved even in jurisdictions which have had comparatively long experience with
fusion.52
The first and perhaps the easiest problem to solve is that
which is created by the opposing formulations of the rules of
equity and law in matters which for convenience can be called
matters of substance. This problem has not caused a great
deal of difficulty. Equity undertook in these situations to control the operation of the legal rule in order that no injustice
result. In those cases where there is a clear collision, e.g., in
the rules regarding fraud in the inducement as affecting
sealed instruments, where both law and equity are to be applied together the equity rule must prevail. 5 This is the result
whether the statute so provides or not. Where the collision
is not head-on and the administration of the equity rule depends largely upon discretion, the result is not so clear and
will depend upon the extent to which equitable characteristics
continue to control judicial administration. It is less obvious
51 Sidney Post Simpson, "Fifty Years of American Equity," 50 Harv. L. Rev.
171 at 180 (1936).
52 Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies, pp. 1159-60.
•53 William F. Walsh, "Merger of Law and Equity under Codes and Other
Statutes," 6 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 157 (1929).
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than Walsh seems to think that there will be such sweeping
changes in the character of certain rules of the substantive
law. If, as the Restatement of Property seems to indicate,
there is virtue and utility in applying the term "equitable"
to certain interests in property, it appears unlikely that fusion
will result ipso facto in the adoption of the lien theory of mortgages in states where the intermediate theory prevailed be54
fore.
A few constitutional questions have arisen other than the
grave problem of jury trial. Most of these problems are solved
without difficulty and have not caused trouble in the adminis55
tration of law and equity together.
The discretionary character of equitable relief led to
questions of whether or not, if the same court was given the
power to award both legal and equitable relief, the result
would not be either that all relief would become discretionary
or that all relief would become of course. 5 There has been
little criticism along these lines and fusion has probably given
57
substantially no trouble in this regard.
A much more serious question is whether or not the pleadings must indicate in advance whether the action is one "at
law" or in "equity," and whether the proof must conform to
this theory of the pleadings even though the pleader may
prove himself entitled to relief upon some other theory. This
is the so-called "theory of the case" doctrine. It has been
criticized on the ground that "the former principles of equity
jurisprudence are now a part of our one body of applicable
legal rules" and the demand for relief is no part of the cause
of action.5 8 It has been said that the "theory of the case" doctrine is attributable in part to code provisions limiting the relief to that asked in the complaint and in part to the fear of
54

Ibid.

55 Charles T. McCormick, "The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States
Courts," 6 N. C. L. Rev. 283 (1928). But see Clark, Code Pleading, pp. 60-1.
56 Roscoe Pound, "The Decadence of Equity," 5 Col. L. Rev. 20 (1905); W. S.
Holdsworth, "Blackstone's Treatment of Equity," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1929).
57 See the point of view of the effects of "fusion" as stated by 0. L. McCaskll
in "One Form of Action, But What Procedure, For the Federal Courts," 30 Ill.
L. Rev. 415 (1935).
58 Charles E. Clark, "The Union of Law and Equity," 25 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1925);
Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure," Law:
A Century of Progress, I, 207, 225.
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depriving the parties of the right to trial by jury."9 Whatever
the causes may be, a rigid insistence upon conformation of
the proof to the theory of the case as stated in the pleadings
seems to continue a vice which fusion was called upon to end.
Allied to this problem is the problem of the code cause of
action. Questions difficult for the courts to answer have arisen
as to the application of the doctrine of res judicata in cases
where the plaintiff might have joined matters under the code
which must have been handled in two suits under the former
practice. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in
these cases in deciding what makes up a cause of action."0
There is also the problem of joinder of legal and equitable
issues and causes of action. A number of questions arise
concerning the extent to which joinder shall be permitted, and
whether a plaintiff who could have asked for complete relief
in equity shall be permitted under the code to split his cause
of action so as to secure a jury trial as to matters of legal relief."' There is also the problem of equitable defenses with its
group of questions. What is meant by "equitable defense"?
How shall equitable defenses be set up in the pleadings? What
should be the mode of trial?6 2
Finally, there is the problem of jury trial. The constitutional right to a trial by jury has been considered the greatest
obstacle in the way of anything like a complete fusion of law
and equity. It has created the greatest number of questions
and is directly concerned in several of the problems already
mentioned. The difficulty lies in the necessity for preserving
the right as it existed at common law when in fact the other
important procedural aspects have been radically changed.
It has been thought inadvisable to extend the right of jury
59 Fleming James, Jr., "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure," 45 Yale L. J. 1022 (1936).
60 Charles E. Clark, "The Code Cause of Action," 33 Yale L. J. 817 (1924);
0. L. McCaskill, "Actions and Causes of Action," 34 Yale L. J. 614 (1925);
Fleming James, Jr., "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure,"
45 Yale L. J. 1022 (1936).
61 0. L. McCaskill, "One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, For the
Federal Courts," 30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935).
62 Walter Wheeler Cook, "Equitable Defenses," 32 Yale L. J. 645 (1923); E. W.
Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 717 (1920);
Note by R. W. Eiler, 11 Cornell L. Q. 396 (1926); Robert M. Hutchins, "Equitable
Ejectment," 26 Col. L. Rev. 436 (1926); J. P. McBaine, "Equitable Defenses to
Actions at Law in the Federal Courts," 17 Calif. L. Rev. 591 (1929).
63 Charles E. Clark, "Trial of Actions under the Code," 11 Cornell L. Q. 482
(1926).
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trial, and various devices such as jury fees and provisions for
waiver have been utilized to confine it. 4 It may be, as Millar
suggests,6 5 that American courts have tended to magnify the
difficulty. Nevertheless, courts are required to devise some
working formula for determining in advance of trial what
matters must go to the jury and what matters should be tried
by the court. The matter is sometimes further complicated
by the assertion of a constitutional right to have equity matters tried by the court with a jury acting in no more than an
advisory capacity.6"
These and kindred problems have made the course of
fusion anything but a smooth one. Difficulties remain to be
eliminated even in those jurisdictions where experience with
fusion has been longest. Many of these difficulties seem to be
occasioned by the fact that in the thinking which has been
done about the provisions of modern procedural statutes
equity is assumed to be a substance compounded of all the
various elements already discussed. Without analysis it is
taken for granted that this compound equity is intended
wherever the term is used in the codes. Thus a habit of
thought threatens to render equity vague to the point of
losing whatever utility it possesses as a symbol. Different
results could have been achieved by interpreting the symbol
in the light of the purposes of its use, and the errors common
to most distinctions declared to be fundamental could have
been avoided.
Against a traditional background of the separate administration of the equity law and in an atmosphere sophisticated by the unfortunate experiences of others with the problems of fusion noted above, the Illinois Civil Practice Act of
1933 appeared. In view of the fact that fusion of law and
equity was believed by many to be the "foundation principle
and in view of the lack of agreement
of the code reform '
about what can be and is intended to be fused, it is not strange
that the act should be received with scorn and praise.
64 Fleming James, Jr., "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure," 45 Yale L. J. 1022 (1926).
65 Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure,"
Law: A Century of Progress, I, p. 226.
06 Clark, Code Pleading, pp. 60, 61.
07 Charles E. Clark, "The Union of Law and Equity," 25 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1925).
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Still more recently, a notable attempt at reform was made in Illinois with
the adoption of a new practice act, effective January 1, 1934. That act in
substance seems to call for a real union of law and equity, but, apparently
due to opposition the provisions concerning this point are sufficiently
vague and uncertain as to make future litigation seem inevitable with
the probable result of hindering, if not postponing altogether that vitally
important feature of modern procedural reform. 68

With this statement can be compared the following from the
pen of an authority no less eminent in the field of procedure.
As witness [of the trend toward fusion] may be cited the case of Illinois,
which in 1933, swung from a conservatism more pronounced perhaps,
than that of any other Anglo-American jurisdiction to an acceptance of
merger whose approach to completeness ranks it among the most advanced in the country. 69

Views so widely variant as these call for careful appraisal of
the act to ascertain, if possible, just what has happened to
"equity" under its provisions. 71
It may be safely assumed that the general objectives of
the Illinois act were the same as those of the other statutes
belonging to the new order of things in civil procedure. Although considerable infiltration of equitable principles had
already taken place in Illinois, the separate administration of
law and equity led the courts into the usual errors of nonrecognition and refusal. Litigation was costly too, and there
were the artificialities and anachronisms of the existing systems of common law and equity pleading to be dealt with.
With these problems in mind, the draftsmen, prominent in
the field of procedure, approached the task of realizing for
Illinois the advantages and gains won by the code movement
down to 1933.
Their first section mentions equity, and throughout the
act the term is employed in such a way as to indicate that it
68 Charles E. Clark and James Wm.Moore, "A New Federal Civil Procedure.
L The Background," 44 Yale L. J. 387 (1935).
69 Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure,"
Law: A Century of Progress, I, 207, 228-9.
70 See also the views expressed in the following: Edward W. Hinton, "Pleading
under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 580 (1934); Roswell
Magill, "The New Illinois Civil Practice Act: Pleading," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
171 (1934); Robert Wyness Millar, "Pleading under the Illinois Civil Practice
Act," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 460 (1934); Charles E. Clark, "The New Illinois Civil
Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 209 (1934); Edson R. Sunderland, "Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 861 (1934).
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held for them a useful significance. In modern usage, "equity" symbolizes powers, remedies, rules, procedure, and discretion. What is the Illinois "equity" of the Civil Practice
Act?
The first, second, and fourth sections of the act furnish
sufficient indication of the ideals which the draftsmen had
before them. By the first section the act is made to apply to
"all civil proceedings, both at law and in equity" with stated
exceptions. 7 ' In the second section the Supreme Court is empowered to make rules consistent with the act for the purpose
of making it effective "for the convenient administration of
justice, and, otherwise, simplifying judicial procedure." 7 2
Finally, in the fourth section it is provided that the act is to
be liberally construed "to the end that controversies may be
speedily and finally determined according to the substantive
rights of the parties." Nor is that ancient citadel of judicial
conservatism, the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, to turn back the forces
of change. 73 The stated objectives are the objectives of the
code reform, simplification, certainty in result, and elimination of delay.
Nowhere does the Illinois act provide that the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity has been abolished.
Instead, Section 31, after abolishing the names used to distinguish the actions at law and their formal characteristics
of pleading, provides that "there shall be no distinctions respecting the manner of pleading between such actions at law
and suits in equity. . . . " And the same section speaks of
causes of action "either at law or in equity." It is this approach that the proponents of fusion have chiefly criticized.
A lawyer from a neighboring state was especially outspoken
in charging that the act retained the old practice because it
did not abolish distinctions between law and equity.74 He contrasted Section 3175 with the language of the Missouri code
to the disadvantage of the former.
73 Ibid., 1 128.
72 Ibid., § 126.
Ill.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 125.
74 C. W. German, "Illinois Civil Practice Act," 5 Mo. B. J. 85 (1934).
75 Mll.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110 § 155. Compare Missouri Code of Civil Procedure,
§ 696, which reads: "There shall be in his state but one form of action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights, and redress or prevention of private
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action .... ." Rev. Stat. 1929, § 696.
71
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But this and other criticisms are not entirely sound. Chiefly, they overlook the fact that "equity" is a term, the wordsymbol of an idea. Complete identity between a term and the
thought it expresses is never possible. Moreover, many legal
terms cover a congeries of ideas, and so shift in use as one
element or another is emphasized. This oversight leads to the
fallacy of assuming the same image whenever "equity" is
used. Thus it is assumed to be necessary to provide that there
shall be no "distinctions between actions at law and suits in
equity" or that "there shall be but one form of action" in
order successfully to accomplish the purposes of the code
reform. It is likely that the view that terms in law have different meanings depending upon their use will be objected
to as leading to confusion. The only answer is that such is the
fact and confusion lies in the failure to recognize it.
When the New York Commissioners provided that the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity were abolished no one expected the powers of courts called equitable
powers, or the rules, remedies, or discretion of equity to drop
out of the law. All these were necessary in the legal order.
Nor was it thought, for example, that the distinctions between
ordinary judgments for damages and decrees for injunctions,
and the legal effects of them would disappear. Indeed, the
only way to achieve the latter result would be either to abolish
such judgments, or to abolish injunctions, or to abolish both
of them and substitute something new. No such changes were
contemplated. What was expected was that the difficulties
with competing jurisdictions before discussed would end. Toward this result, the terms "equity" and "law" to describe
different types of proceedings would, it was hoped, cease to
be used. But the habits of lawyers and judges, the need for
reliance on precedents couched in the old terminology, the
linguistic features of constitutions, and the characteristic
phrases of text books were too strong to be thus overcome.
It is not strange, therefore, that the Illinois draftsmen
should begin more cautiously with language declaring that
the distinctions in the manner of pleading between actions at
law and suits in equity no longer exist. The fact that the term
''equity" is not also abolished does not mean that beneficial
results have not been or cannot be accomplished. To assume
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so, is to be prey to the fallacy of assuming complete identity
between the term and an idea and to fail to recognize that the
term has more than one meaning.
Section 31 with other sections of the act achieves one of
the major objectives of the reform movement. It establishes
a unified system of pleading. And this is true fusion or
merger. The systems of common law pleading and equity
pleading are gone and in their place is a new system compounded of the best elements in both.7 6
To what extent does the Illinois act serve as a corrective
of the other major ills caused by the separate administration
of the rules of equity and law? It has already been pointed
out that the act continues the use of the terms "equity," and
"law" as describing different types of proceedings." Is it
possible for Illinois courts to employ legal and equitable
powers, grant legal and equitable remedies, and apply legal
and equitable rules together in the same suit or proceeding?
It has been stated elsewhere in this article that the circuit
courts (including the Superior Court of Cook County) are
given law and equity powers by the state Constitution.7 8
Down to 1934 the law and equity sides of these courts were
maintained as distinct and separate as such a system permits. 79 It seems quite clear that Section 44 of the 1933 act
is intended to permit the use by the courts of both their law
and equity powers and remedies in a single case or proceeding.8 0 Provision is made for the joinder in the pleadings of
claims for legal and equitable relief. Moreover, it is provided that legal and equitable issues may be tried together
where no jury is employed. Although the law and equity
sides of the courts remain, the provisions for transfer do
away with most of the evils of competing jurisdictions before
76 Edson R. Sunderland, "Analysis of the Civil Practice Act of 1933," 18 Jones
1ll. Stat. Ann. 18 (1934). This author notes that uniform procedure in law and
equity has been accomplished in most instances by making the equity rules
applicable to both types of proceedings.
77 "Throughout the Illinois act there is constant recognition of the persistent
differences between the two classes of action." Edward W. Hinton, "Pleading
Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 580 (1934).
78 Constitution of 1870, Art. VI, § 12. And see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 22, 1 1.
79 In Cook County the designation of certain judges as chancellors for the
term, made the separation probably more complete there than elsewhere in
the state.
80 I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168.
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described. Judge Clark, severest critic of the efforts of the
Illinois draftsmen and ardent advocate of the abolition of
the use of the term "equity' in any save an historical sense
seems to feel that the bad job of fusion accomplished by
Section 44 is made worse by the fact that Section 981 preserves
"that grand old anachronism," the injunction to stay proceedings at law.82 But there are situations where such injunctions, anachronisms or not, may serve useful purposes. 3
At any rate, the act is sufficiently flexible and the rule-making
power sufficiently broad to obviate any serious consequences
of the retention of the injunction against proceedings at law.
From the above discussion it will be seen that at least
two long steps toward procedural reform along the approved
modern lines were taken in Illinois. The objection that the
act fails to accomplish anything like the desired complete
merger of law and equity seems to be based primarily on
its terminology. Throughout, the phrases "actions at law,"
"actions in equity," "legal issues," and "equitable issues"
are employed.84 As has been pointed out this technique has
been praised and criticized. 5 Along with this nomenclature,
the term "civil action" is also used. 6 The use of "civil
action" has evidently caused some confusion, due largely to
its employment in a strictly technical sense in the statutes
of many other states.8 7 In a recent case, Frank v. Newburger,
the Appelate Court, per Judge O'Connor, held that a verified
motion under Section 7289 of the Civil Practice Act was proper
to correct a decree for errors of fact in a mortgage foreclosure suit. This holding overruled an argument that Section
72 (formerly Section 89 of the Practice Act of 1907) merely
81 Ibid., § 133.
82 Charles E. Clark, "The New Illinois Civil Practice Act,"
Rev. 209 (1934).

1 U. of Chi. L.

83 See Anderson v. Collinson, 300 Ill. App. 22, 20 N.E. (2d) 980 (1939).
84 E. g. iM. Civil Practice Act, §§ 31, 44, 61 ("Chancery Action"), 89.
85 "Unlike the Field Code of New York it does not attempt to do the impossible,
that is, to abolish the distinction between legal and equitable actions." Edward
R. Hinton, "Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev
580 (1934). Compare article by Charles E. Clark in the same volume, 1 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 209.
86 E. g. §§ 5, 9. And see Rule 9.
87 Thompson's Laws of New York 1939, Part II, Civil Practice Act, § 8, which
reads: "There is only one form of civil action ......
88 298 Ill.
App. 548, 19 N. E. (2d) 147 (1939).
89 Ill.
Rev. Stat 1939, Ch. 110 § 196.
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provided for motions in the nature of writs of error coram
nobis and was inapplicable to equity proceedings. The opinion reasoned the result on the basis of the consolidation, in
part, of proceedings at law and in equity by the Civil Practice
Act, citing Sections 1 and 31. A commentator interpreted
this to be a determination by the court that the act "establishes one form of civil action in Illinois." 90 In a letter 91
Judge O'Connor pointed out the error, saying in part: "We
think it obvious that the Civil Practice Act did not establish
one form of civil action in this state and we have written
many opinions to this effect." This view is supported by the
language of some Supreme Court opinions, e.g. "The present suit, being an action in ejectment, is a suit at law and
not in equity ... 92 Where the term "civil action" is employed it is used merely as a term of convenience where it
to classify together "actions at
is desired for some purpose
' 9.3
law" and "in equity.
What is meant by "actions in equity" as distinguished
from "actions at law?" The inquiry is directed at determining their meaning as used in the statute, not at determining
a meaning that would be valid wherever the phrases might
be employed. When Sections 31, 44, 61 and 63 are compared
with Supreme Court Rule 994 little doubt is left concerning
the meaning of these terms. The phrase "action in equity"
is simply used to designate those cases in which a claim is
asserted to some remedy or remedies which by long established usage have been called equitable.9" Thus, in Illinois
there are two types of action for the purposes of the Civil
Practice Act, distinguishable by the character of the remedies
90 27 Ill.B. J. 284 (1939), where the commentator said: "Under this theory
the terms 'law' and 'equity' are anachronistic but are used for convenience."
The dissenting opinion in the Frank case seemed to indicate that Judge Matchett
shared, to some extent, the commentator's view of the majority holding.
91 27 Ill.B. J. 313 (1939).
218, 15 N. E. (2d) 685 (1938). Compare Harris v.
92 Braun v. Maloy, 369 Ill.
Ingleside Building Corp., 370 Ill.617, 19 N. E. (2d) 585 (1939), where the court
said: "That act . . . abolishes the distinction between actions at law or in

equity .... "
93 Section 5 provides that "every civil action," with some exceptions, "shall
be commenced by the filing of a complaint." Section 9 provides for venue in
certain types of "civil actions" some of which would be equitable in nature.
94 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.9. This rule as presently worded was part
of the original schedule of rules prepared by the draftsmen of the act.
95 This will, of course, include suits involving trusts and mortgages.
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sought. And the act permits the joining together of both
kinds of actions in the pleadings, and, subject to limitations,
makes possible their being tried together.
Is such an approach justified, or does the continued use
of the law and equity terminology perpetuate the evils of
the old order of things? In the first place, the terminology
employed has the advantage of being familiar. Moreover,
differences have always existed between suits for the extraordinary equitable remedies and ordinary lawsuits. The
absence of the jury as of right in the former class and the
existence in fact of an "equitable" point of view are substantial distinguishing characteristics, neither of which features were sought to be eliminated by code reform. As long
as the provisions of the act regarding joinder and transfer
are applied by the courts in such a way as to promote the
purposes of the reform, there need be few misgivings about
the retention of the old terminology. 6 Indeed, it is hard to
see how, if the meaning of "equity" is properly understood,
a change in terminology is productive of any thing except
confusion.
In keeping with the mode of approach discussed above,
the term "equitable" is used to modify "issues" in Section
44.97 The purposes of this section make the meaning of the
phrase free from serious difficulty. It was contemplated
among other things, that defensive pleadings stating matters
which would have called for the granting of remedies formerly obtainable only through separate suits in equity, might
be interposed to complaints seeking only ordinary relief.
Again constitutional provisions regarding the mode of trial
and considerations involving the equity point of view require
the segregation of such matters. This is the more easily
accomplished where familiar terms are employed.
The experience of the courts with the act has not been
long enough nor sufficiently varied to have produced authoritative determinations of how the major problems of fusion
are to be met. There do exist a number of decisions which
furnish some indication of the attitude of the judges toward
96 See 0. L. McCaskill, "One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, For
the Federal Courts," 30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935), and "Actions and Causes of
Action," by the same author in 34 Yale L. J. 614 (1925).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168, and see § 213 (Civil Practice Act, § 89).
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the purposes and policies of the act. There is no hint of a
hostile attitude such as has attended the adoption of sweeping
legislative reforms of court procedure in some states. One
court has said in response to an argument for a strict construction of the Rules of Court designed to give effect to
the Act:
The purpose of the entire act was to simplify the procedure and the
prime object of the act was to enable the parties to a cause to have
the merits of their controversies passed upon by the courts-the realities
considered rather than that the matter be decided on mere technicalities
which often justly bring the courts into disrepute. If the act is to be
liberally construed according to the substantive rights of the parties, as
it is expressly provided, this puzi'pose will be nullified and the act guillotined by strict construction of rules of court adopted to aid the carrying
of the act into effect-a strange commentary to construe the act liberally
but the rules strictly. 98

A number of cases have appeared in the Supreme and
Appellate Courts in which the provisions permitting the
joinder of actions in equity and at law have been availed of.
In ordinary cases these provisions with their supposed
anachronistic terminology have evidently been giving little
trouble. For example, in People ex rel. Ames v. Marx,"
in a suit against a taxpayer and his surety to collect motor
fuel taxes it was held proper to permit the surety to file a
counterclaim against his principal, claiming indemnity, and
praying that the principal be ordered to assign all rights he
had in certain bank claims. And in State Bank of St. Charles
v. Burr'0 0 a counterclaim for damages sounding in tort was
permitted in a suit to forclose a mortgage. In this case the
issues on the counterclaim were transferred to the law docket
and tried to a jury. Several other cases appear in the reports
evidencing the extent to which joinder of legal and equitable
actions is permitted, in which the opinions do not discuss
the question."'
98 People ex. rel. Wilmette State Bank v. Village of Wilmette, 294 III. App. 362,
13 N. E. (2d) 990 (1938). And for a liberal interpretation of the joinder provisions
see Kronan Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Medeck, 368 Ill. 118, 13 N.. E. (2d) 66 (1938),
commented on in 27 Ill. B. J. 131 (1939).
99 299 Ill. App. 284, 20 N. E. (2d) 103 (1939).
100 295 Ill. App. 15, 14 N.E. (2d) 511 (1938), reversed on other grounds in 372
Ill. 114, 22 N. E. (2d) 941 (1939). The joinder was held proper in the Supreme
Court.
101 Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412, 21 N. E. (2d) 294
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Court handling of fusion statutes in some states has led
to a continuation or resurrection of some of the old difficulties
experienced in the days of competing jurisdictions. One of
the principal sources of trouble, as already stated, has been
the "theory of the case" doctrine. Under this doctrine, a
litigant is required to allege facts which entitle him to the
relief sought. And upon the trial he must prove such facts
entitling him to relief consistent with the theory on which
his pleading is drawn. 1 2 The penalty for the nonconformist is
dismissal, even though the facts proved show him to be
entitled to different relief upon another theory. At the root
of the matter, is the strict insistence upon agreement between
the allegations of the pleadings and the proof. 03 The result
is to perpetuate the very vices which the codes were intended
°
to correct.'O
The unfortunate results of this doctrine need not be
reached in Illinois. Even though actions in equity and at
law still endure, they do not necessitate any such consequences.. Under the requirements of Section 31105 it appears
that the pleader must allege facts entitling him to the relief
sought, since that section provides that "the substantial
averments of fact necessary to state any cause of action
either at law or in equity" shall not be affected in any way.
But it would seem that under the language of Section 34106
the court is not obliged to insist upon rigid agreement between pleadings and proof to the extent usual under the
"theory of the case" doctrine. It is expressly provided that
the prayer for relief shall not limit the relief obtainable,
except in case of default. 10 7 Moreover, the pleader may se(1939); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 371 Ill.
341, 20 N.E. .(2d) 784 (1939);
Economy Dairy Co. v. Kerner, 371 Ill.261, 20 N. E. (2d) 568 (1939); Damron v.
City of Eldorado, 300 Ill.
App. 481, 21 N. E. (2d) 641 (1939); Engelstein v. Shammo,
296 Ill.
App. 162, 15 N. E. (2d) 939 (1938).
102 Fleming James, Jr., "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure," 45 Yale L. J. 1022 (1936).
103 Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure,"
Law: A Century of Progress, I, 207, 227.
104 Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917); City of Syracuse v.
Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923). Compare the earlier New York case
of Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62 (1859). See also Brown v. Baldwin, 46 Wash. 106,
89 P. 483 (1907).
105 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 155.
106 Ibid., § 158.
187 The rest of the sentence containing this provision, "...
but where other
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cure a large measure of protection by asking for relief appropriate to different theories in the alternative." 8 If "action
in equity" is given the meaning herein contended for, the
conclusion seems sound that, when the provisions of Section
44 with respect to transfer from one side of the court to the
0 9 are read with
other"
those of Section 34 just discussed, there
will be no penalizing of litigants who have mistakenly drawn
their pleadings upon an erroneous theory as to the kind of
remedy they were entitled to. The language of Section 44,
" . . . and when so transferred shall proceed as though commenced on the proper side of the court. .. " seems intended
to cover just such cases."0 To the suggestion that the provisions of Section 44 contemplate a transfer only at the pleading stage and not after or during trial, it may be answered
that this does violence to the plain meani-g of the language.
The admonition of Section 4"' that the act be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes will not be ignored." 2 The
provisions of Supreme Court Rule 9 115 requiring complaints
to be designated "at law" or "in chancery" is easily complied with, since complaints are to be marked "in chancery"
whenever any equitable remedy is asked. This rule is for
purposes of administrative convenience and should cause no
difficulties." 4
As has been mentioned before, fusion creates serious
relief is sought the court shall, by proper orders, and upon such terms as may
be just, protect the adverse party against prejudice by reason of surprise," indicates an intention to reject the doctrine.
log Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 158. It is provided in section 43 of the Civil
Practice Act that, when in doubt as to which of two statements of fact is true,
they may be stated in the alternative, . . . and a bad alternative shall not
affect a good one ..
"
109 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168.
110 The phrase "causes of action," used in section 44 in association with
"counterclaims," thus is used generally to signify any group of facts which together entitle the plaintiff to any relief whether legal or equitable.
111 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 128.
112 Only two cases, decided under the Act of 1933, have been found in which
the problem here discussed was involved: Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Nudelman,
371 Ill. 217, 20 N.E. (2d) 277 (1939), and Allen v. Illinois Mineral Co., 299 Ill. App.
537, 20 N.E. (2d) 898 (1939). In both cases complaints were dismissed because
legal remedies were thought to be adequate. Neither of the opinions indicates
that the problem was presented to the courts. The Acme case, moreover, in.
volved tax proceedings in which certiorari was held appropriate.
11s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110 § 259.9.
114 But see Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies, p. 1158.

EQUITY AND "FUSION" IN ILLINOIS

problems of what must be and what may be joined in a single
action, and whether matters formerly triable together in an
equity proceeding may be separated in order to secure a
jury trial. Some of these problems have been solved in
Illinois by making the joinder provisions permissive."' The
rule-making power of the Supreme Court has been utilized
to solve others. Consistent with the design of the act to
retain two kinds of actions but to permit them to be joined
in the pleadings, the former suit in equity is treated as a
unit for this purpose."' All matters which could have been
determined by an equity court in order to do complete justice
between the parties may be treated as a single equitable
cause of action. Matters which, under the former system,
could be treated as separate suits at law and in equity, may
be joined but are to be set out as separate causes of action
and so designated."' To avoid abuse, the trial court is empowered to determine whether such causes of action are
properly severable and whether, if so, they shall be tried
separately or together, subject, of course, to the requisite
of preserving the right to trial by jury. The treatment of
these problems is open to the objection that since the joinder
provisions are permissive, undesirable multiple actions are
allowed. In some respects, this approach is simpler, however, since it continues the older treatment of causes of
action and avoids the confusing and difficult problems related to the code cause of action." 8 The Illinois system makes
easier the determination of the mode of trial. The former
rule in equity concerning the granting of legal relief is continued and the pleader may thus merge his demands for
legal remedies in his equitable cause of action or state them
as a separate cause of action at law which he may join with
a cause of action in equity. If properly merged, all matters
will be determined as a single equitable cause of action. 119
115 111. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168.
116

Ibid., § 259.10.

117 Ibid., § 259.11.
118 See 0. L. McCaskill, "One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, For

the Federal Courts," 30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935) and "Actions and Causes of
Action," 34 Yale L. J. 614 (1925). And see Charles E. Clark, "The Code Cause of
Action," 33 Yale L. J. 817 (1924).
119 Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and Walter V. Schaefer, "The New Rules of the
Illinois Supreme Court under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
752 (1934); Illinois Civil Practice Act Ann. (1936 ed.), p. 99; 0. L. McCaskill,
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Along with the problems of joinder and merger just discussed, fusion statutes have raised the problem of the equitable defense. And in some jurisdictions, less ambitious movements toward fusion have made use of the statutory device
of permitting equitable defenses to actions at law. 120 Some
confusion over just what was meant by the term "equitable
defense" resulted and its use has been criticized. 121 Again,
the confusion was due in large part to a failure to interpret
the term in the light of its use. Equitable defense statutes
were intended to put an end to the necessity of resorting to
injunctive remedies to restrain proceedings at law. In the
course of his modification of the ordinary law, the Chancellor
undertook to control the operation of certain legal rules by
directing injunctions to persons seeking unjustifiably to avail
themselves of these rules. As equity became law, injunctions
to restrain legal proceedings came to be recognized equitable
remedies governed by a group of fairly definite rules. The
cumbersome nature of such a system led to efforts to reform
it. The term "equitable defense" was employed to describe
matters which would be grounds for seeking injunctive relief
against such proceedings at law. Such equitable defenses
were formerly causes of action in equity albeit they were
defensive or protective in nature. Perhaps some such phrase
but when
as "defensive equity"' 2 2 would have been better,
12 3
plain.
is
meaning
the
view,
in
kept
is
the object
Nevertheless, equitable defense statutes created two
serious problems. The first was how to plead such matters,
whether as mere defenses or as cross-actions. The second
involved the mode of trial. If such matters become merely
defenses to actions at law it could be argued that they should
be tried by the jury as any other defenses.
Soon after the adoption of the Civil Practice Act of 1933
"One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, For the Federal Courts," 30
Mll. L. Rev. 415 (1935).
120 Scott and Simpson, Cases on Judicial Remedies, p. 1146.
121 Edward W. Hinton, Lectures on Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933), p. 127.
122

Ibid., p. 133.

128 Walter Wheeler Cook, "Equitable Defenses," 32 Yale L. J. 645 (1923);
Robert Wyness Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure," Law:
A Century of Progress, I, 207, 225; Edward W. Hinton, "Equitable Defenses
Under Modern Codes," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 717 (1920); J. P. McBaine, "Equitable
Defenses to Actions at Law in the Federal Courts," 17 Calif. L. Rev. 591 (1929);
note by R. W. Efler in 11 Cornell L. Q. 396 (1926).
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doubts were expressed as to whether that act permitted
equitable defenses to actions at law.'24 The language employed is far from being a clear expression of the legislative
intention regarding this important matter. The solution
appears to rest upon the construction which the Supreme
Court will ultimately place upon Sections 38, 43, and 44, together with the interpretation of its own Rules 10 and 11. In
Section 38 it is provided that " . . . any demand by one or
more defendants... whether in the nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-bill in equity or otherwise, and whether in tort
or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for
other relief, may be pleaded as a cross-demand in any action..
... 2 In Section 43 parties are permitted to plead as
many counterclaims and defenses as they may have and,
when in doubt as to which of two statements of fact is true,
CC *when they appear in different counts or defenses (whether legal or equitable) . . . " to state the counts or defenses
in the alternative.12 Finally Section 44 allows a defendant
to set up in his answer "... any and all cross-demands, whatever, whether in the nature of recoupment, set-off, cross-bill
in equity, or otherwise. . . . " If it is remembered that the
stated purpose of the act is to provide for the speedy and
final determination of controversies according to the substantive rights of the parties,'2 7 a case can be made for equitable defenses. The act has preserved actions in equity as
distinct from actions at law. Defensive equity suits to relieve
against oppressive legal proceedings are necessarily within
this class. Where the statutory provisions above set forth
employ the terms "demands" and "cross-demands" it seems
reasonable to say that such terms include as "demands"
relief which defendants might be entitled to against the improper enforcement of legal proceedings. In view of the
manifest intention of Section 44 to permit joinder of legal and
equitable actions and issues and thus to abolish such a large
part of the evils of the former system, any other holding
124 Edward W. Hinton, "Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 580 (1934) and Lectures on Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933), p.
125.
125 Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162, italics supplied.
126 Ibid., § 167.
127

Ibid., § 128.
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would seem unjustifiable. The unfortunate uses of the term
"cross-bill in equity" in Sections 38 and 44 must have been
intended to cover actions defensive in nature and to have
been employed because such actions are asserted by a defendant. Rules 10 and 11128 covering the merger and joinder
problems before discussed lend added support to these views,
particularly since Rule 11 is expressly applicable to defensive pleadings. The retention in Section 9129 of injunctions
to stay proceedings at law is made necessary by the fact
that the Civil Practice Act does not apply to certain types
of proceedings which are regulated under special statutes. 13 °
Assuming that equitable defenses are permitted in
Illinois,'' a question arises as to how they shall be pleaded.
In view of the provisions of Sections 38 and 44 providing for
the setting up of cross-demands and for their designation as
counterclaims, they should be set forth as cross-actions praying affirmative relief. 3 2 But it should be noted that both
Section 38 and Section 44 are expressly subject to rules of
court. It would seem desirable for the Supreme Court by
rule to permit such matters as in substance merely contest
the plaintiff's right to recover, to be set forth as defenses
in the answer. A counterclaim should be required only where
the facts necessitate affirmative relief in addition to defeating the cause of action."'
Finally, the lack of clearly expressed intention in the
Illinois statute presents an additional problem. Assuming
that equitable defenses are permitted, may the defendant
who has failed to assert such a defense in proceedings brought
against him, obtain an injunction in a separate action against
the enforcement of the plaintiff's claim. This seems a likely
Ibid., §§ 259.10 and 259.11.
Ibid., § 133.
130 Ibid., § 125. See use of these injunctions in Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill.
App. 22, 20 N. E. (2d)
617, 198 N. E. 723 (1935) and Anderson v. Collinson, 300 Ill.
980 (1939).
131 The point was involved in Allen v. Sanders, 369 Ill. 466, 17 N. E. (2d) 28
(1938) but was not considered by the Supreme Court, since it was not passed
upon by the trial court. It appears that "equitable defenses" were allowed in
Brand v. Schmitz, 293 Ill.App. 114, 11 N.E. (2d) 974 (1937).
132 Edward W. Hinton, "Pleading under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 580 (1934).
"Pleading Under the New Illinois Civil Practice
'33 Robert Wyness Mi11ar,
Act., 28 111. L. Rev. 460 (1934).
128
129
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result in view of the fact that the joinder provisions of the
act of 1933 are permissive. Here again the same criticism
of the allowance of multiple actions may be made.'3 4
The approach employed in Illinois has made easier the
determination of the mode of trial, not only where equitable
defenses are involved, but wherever a proceeding before a
court includes both equity and law matters which must have
been separated under the former system. As has been pointed out before, the act preserves the equity action as a unit
and provides for equitable issues which may arise in actions
at law. The constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by
jury is simply a requirement that the right continue as at
common law. Where equity actions simply carry forward
under the new procedure the old equity suit as a unit, there
is no difficulty under Section 44 in determining the mode of
trial, even when such action is joined with other matters
which can not be merged into the equity action. The section
wisely allows the court in its discretion to order separate
trials where convenience will be served.' " Likewise, the use
of the term "equitable issues" to designate, among other
things, matters defensive in nature but formerly causes of
action in equity, and the provisions for their separate trial
and transfer from one side of the court'3 6 to the other seem
adequate to guard against expansion of the right to jury trial
beyond the extent of the constitutional guarantee. The provisions of Section 64111 employ the device of requiring jury
demands from each party at the earliest practical time.
Where the plaintiff begins an equity action and the facts
proved show him to be entitled to legal but not equitable
134 This problem was involved in the situation presented in Printers Corp.
v. Hamilton Inv. Co., 295 Ill. App. 34, 14 N. E. (2d) 517 (1938). In this case an
injunction was allowed to restrain the enforcement of judgments obtained by
confession where motions to vacate the judgments had been overruled. Apparently the problem of the propriety of equitable defenses was not passed upon
by the court. See criticisms of the case in 27 Ill. B. J. 205 and 6 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 500. And see the reference to this case in the letter of Judge O'Connor in
27 Ill. B. J. 313, mentioned before (note 91).
135 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168. See also the provision for juries in
equity cases in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 187.
136 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168; and Rule 11, 11l. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110,
§ 259.11. These transfer provisions were employed in State Bank of St. Charles
v. Burr, 295 Ill. App. 15, 14 N.E. (2d) 511 (1938); 372 I1. 114, 22 N.E. (2d) 941
(1939).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 188.
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relief, the case can be transferred to the law side of the court.
In this event, it would seem constitutionally necessary to
grant a jury demand by either party.'3 8
The year 1933 marked the end of a long tradition of the
separate administration of law and equity in Illinois. In
spite of the criticisms mentioned before, it now appears that
some of the greatest advantages of the movement toward
fusion have been realized and some of its most serious difficulties avoided. Complete fusion is impossible in Illinois as
elsewhere where constitutional guarantees of trial by jury
as at common law exist. Moreover, complete fusion requires
the creation of a procedural system entirely new in place of
the old. The nature of even the formal side of law does not
easily permit such a complete break with the past. Equity
still exists in Illinois, as it still exists wherever the common
law and equity tradition took root. Whether the Civil Practice Act will establish for Illinois the complete partnership
between the two elements in the legal system that is the ideal
of the code movement will depend upon whether or not the
courts continue to interpret and construe the act in the light
of its purposes. The preservation of the term "equity" in
the procedural system may serve as a reminder of the need
in law to strike the proper balance between flexibility and rule.
138 0. L. McCaskill, "One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, For the
Federal Courts," 30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935).
For a valuable discussion of the
various problems concerning jury trials under fusion statutes see Fleming James,
Jr., "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure," 45 Yale L. J.
1022 (1936).

